

The early Platonic concept of the soul and Plutarch's *De animae procreatione in Timaeo*

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- T 1 τῆς ἀμεροῦς καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταύτου φύσεως αὖ πέρι καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἐτέρου· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα συνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τ' ἀμεροῦς αὐτὴν [αὐτῶν: Plato mss.] καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ. καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ ὄντα συνεκεράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταὐτὸ συναρμόττων βίᾳ· μὴνυς δὲ μετὰ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἐκ τριῶν ποιησάμενος ἓν, πάλιν ὅλον τοῦτο μοίρας εἰς ἃς προσήκε διένειμεν, ἐκάστην δὲ τούτων ἕκ τε ταύτου καὶ θατέρου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας μεμιγμένην· ἤρχετο δὲ διαίρειν ὧδε.
- Of the indivisible and ever invariable being and of the divisible on the other hand that comes to pass in the case of bodies he blended together out of both a third kind of being in the middle, and in regard to the nature of sameness again and that of difference he also in this way compounded it in the middle of the indivisible and what is divisible among bodies. And he took them, three as they were, and blended them all together into a single entity, forcibly fitting into sameness the nature of difference, which is refractory to mixture, and mixing them together with being. (trans. H. Cherniss)
- T 2 Ar. DA I.2, 404b16-30: (a) τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ· γινώσκεισθαι γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὁμοίον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι. (b) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λεγομένοις διωρίσθη, αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ ζῶον ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέας καὶ τοῦ πρώτου μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὁμοιοτρόπως· (c) ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως, (c1) νοῦν μὲν τὸ ἓν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ τὰ δύο (μοναχῶς γὰρ ἐφ' ἓν), τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθμὸν δόξαν, αἴσθησιν δὲ τὸν τοῦ στερεοῦ. (c2) οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμοὶ τὰ εἶδη αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐλέγοντο, εἰσὶ δ' ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων, κρίνεται δὲ τὰ πράγματα τὰ μὲν νῶ, τὰ δ' ἐπιστήμη, τὰ δὲ δόξη, τὰ δ' αἰσθήσει· (c3) εἶδη δ' οἱ ἀριθμοὶ οὗτοι τῶν πραγμάτων. (d) ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ κινητικὸν ἐδόκει ἢ ψυχὴ εἶναι καὶ γνωριστικὸν οὕτως, ἔνιοι συνέπλεξαν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἀποφηνάμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθμὸν κινεῖν ἑαυτόν.
- (a) In the same manner [sc. as Empedocles] Plato in the *Timaeus* constructs the soul from the elements; for like, he holds, is known by like, and things are formed out of the principles. (b) Similarly also in the lectures 'On Philosophy' it was determined that the Animal-itself is compounded of the Form itself of the One together with the primary length, breadth, and depth, the other [things/animals] being similarly constituted. (c) And in yet another way: (c1) One is intelligence, Two is knowledge (because it goes to one point in a single way), the number of the plane is opinion, the number of the solid sensation; (c2) for the numbers use to be identified with the Forms themselves or principles, and are formed out of the elements; and some things are apprehended by intelligence, others by knowledge, others by opinion, others by sensation; (c3) and these same numbers are the forms of things. (d) And since the soul was deemed to be originaive of both motion and, in this way, of cognition, some thinkers, entwining both aspects, have declared the soul to be a number moving itself.
- T 3 Aet. I.3, Ps.-Plut. 877A, DG 282a5-17: διὸ καὶ ἐφθέγγοντο οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, ὡς μεγίστου ὅρκου ὄντος τῆς τετράδος, 'οὐ μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρεα ψυχᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτύν,' [...] 'καὶ ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ' φησὶν 'ἐκ τετράδος σύγκειται·' εἶναι γὰρ νοῦν ἐπιστήμην δόξαν αἴσθησιν, ἐξ ὧν πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ αὐτοὶ λογικοὶ ἐσμεν. νοῦς μὲν οὖν ἢ μονὰς ἐστίν· ὁ γὰρ νοῦς κατὰ μονάδα θεωρεῖται, κτλ.
- That is why the Pythagoreans used to invoke the tetractys as their most binding oath: «By him who gave the tetractys to our soul, etc. [...]» «And our soul, he says, consists of the tetactys. For it is intellect, knowledge, opinion, sensation, the sources of every art and knowledge and of our rationality. It is the monad which is intellect. For intellect is thought of in accordance with the monad, etc.»

- 1) Part I: Composition of the soul (1012C-1017C; 1022E-1027A)
 - a) Xenocrates (1012D2-F1): definition of soul, based on *Tim.* 35A: number + motion (agreement with Zaratas, teacher of Pythagoras, concerning the dyad)
 - b) Crantor (1012D1-8, 1012F2-1013A5): definition of soul, based on *Tim.* 35A: cognition of intelligible/sensible, in each case discerning identity and difference
 - c) Xenocrates and Crantor reject the temporal origin of the soul (1013A6-11).
 - d) Eudorus claims that Xenocrates and Crantor are probably right in rejecting the soul's temporal origin (1013B5-9).
 - e) 'Most students of Plato' (1013D12-E1) believe the world to be sempiternal (*a parte ante*).
 - f) Those who identify matter with 'necessity' and 'measurelessness' (1014E9-F1).
 - g) Eudemos' misguided criticism of Plato's theory of matter as the principle of evil (1015D7-10).
 - h) Posidonius (1023B5-C11)
 - i) Xenocrates (?) and Posidonius (1023C11-D2)
 - j) Interpreters who criticise Plato's characterisation of 'difference' as 'refractory to mixture' (1023D3-10).
- 2) Part II: harmonic division of the soul (1027A-1027F, 1017C-1022E; 1027F-1030C)
 - a) Quantity of the numbers used
 - i) Some think it is fine to multiply the original numbers (1027D9)
 - ii) Eudorus following Crantor (are these two the 'some' mentioned above?) starts from the number 384 (1020C2-7; 1020D6-7).
 - iii) Eudorus' method for calculating the means (1019E)
 - iv) leimma:
 - (1) 'the customary treatments in the Pythagorean texts/schools' (1020E2-4)
 - (2) 'others' (1022A6)
 - b) Arrangement of the numbers used by Plato
 - i) Theodorus of Soli (1027D1-5; Theodorus is also discussed at *De def. or.* 427A-E)
 - ii) Crantor, Clearchus [1022C8-11]
 - c) Use of the numbers
 - i) Various anonymous interpreters, geometers (1028A9-B4; these are familiar with the astronomy of Hipparchus)
 - ii) Pythagoreans (1028A4-5; C2-3)
 - iii) Chaldeans (1028E11-F2 – a view attributed to the Pythagoreans by Aristides Quintilianus, *De mus.* 3.19)
 - iv) 'some' (not identical with the aforementioned Pythagoreans) (1029A5-6; cf. 1028C)

T 4 1012D2-8: ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν δοκιμωτάτων ἀνδρῶν τοὺς μὲν Ξενοκράτης προσηγάγετο, τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν οὐσίαν ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινούμενον ἀποφηνάμενος, οἱ δὲ Κράντορι τῷ Σολεῖ προσέθεντο, μιγνύντι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τε τῆς νοητῆς καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ δοξαστῆς φύσεως, οἶμαί τι τὴν τούτων ἀνακαλυφθέντων σαφήνειαν ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον ἡμῖν παρέξειν.

Since, however, of the men most highly esteemed some were won over by Xenocrates, who declared the soul's essence to be number itself being moved by itself, and others adhered to Crantor of Soli, who makes the soul a mixture of the intelligible nature and of the opinable nature of perceptible things, I think that the clarification of these two when exposed will afford us something like a keynote.

T 5 1012D9-F1: οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ γένεσιν ἀριθμοῦ δηλοῦσθαι νομίζουσι τῇ μίξει τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ μεριστῆς οὐσίας· ἀμέριστον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐν μεριστῶν δὲ τὸ πλήθος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων γίγνεσθαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ ἐνὸς ὀρίζοντος τὸ πλήθος καὶ τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ πέρας ἐντιθέντος, ἣν καὶ δυάδα καλοῦσιν ἀόριστον (καὶ Ζαράτας ὁ Πυθαγόρου διδάσκαλος ταύτην μὲν ἐκάλει τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μητέρα τὸ δ' ἐν πατέρα· διὸ καὶ βελτίονας εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὅσοι τῇ μονάδι προσεοίκασι). τοῦτον δὲ μήπω ψυχὴν τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κινητικὸν καὶ τὸ κινητὸν ἐνδεῖν αὐτῷ. τοῦ δὲ ταύτου καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου συμμιγνύντων, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ κινήσεως ἀρχὴ καὶ

μεταβολῆς τὸ δὲ μονῆς, ψυχὴν γεγονέναι, μηδὲν ἦττον τοῦ ἰστάναι καὶ ἴστασθαι δύναμιν ἢ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ κινεῖν οὖσαν.

The former [i.e. Xenocrates and his followers] believe that nothing but the generation of number is signified by the mixture of the indivisible and divisible being, the one being indivisible and multiplicity divisible and number being the product of these when the one bounds multiplicity and inserts a limit in infinitude, which they call indefinite dyad too (this Zaratas too, the teacher of Pythagoras, called mother of number; and the one he called father, which is also why he held those numbers to be better that resemble the monad); but they believe that this number is not yet soul, for it lacks motivity and mobility, but that after the commingling of sameness and difference, the latter of which is the principle of motion and change while the former is that of rest, then the product is soul, soul being a faculty of bringing to a stop and being at rest no less than of being in motion and setting in motion.

- T 6 1012F2-1013A5: οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Κράντορα μάλιστα τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἔργον εἶναι τὸ κρίνειν τὰ τε νοητὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τὰς τε τούτων ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα γιγνομένας διαφορὰς καὶ ὁμοιότητας, ἐκ πάντων φασίν, ἵνα πάντα γινώσκῃ, συγκεκράσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν· | ταῦτα δ' εἶναι τέτταρα, τὴν νοητὴν φύσιν αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσιν καὶ τὴν περὶ τὰ σώματα παθητικὴν καὶ μεταβλητὴν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν ταύτου καὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου διὰ τὸ κάκειν ἑκατέραν μετέχειν ἐτερότητος καὶ ταυτότητος.

Crantor and his followers, on the other hand, supposing that the soul's peculiar function is above all to form judgments of the intelligible and the perceptible objects and the differences and similarities occurring among these objects both within their own kind and in relation of either kind to the other, say that the soul, in order that it may know all, has been blended together out of all and that these are four, the intelligible nature, which is ever invariable and identical, and the passive and mutable nature of bodies and furthermore that of sameness and of difference because each of the former two also partakes of diversity and identity.

- T 7 Procl. *in Tim.* III, 2.152.21-30: ἐκ ταύτης δ' οὖν καὶ τῆς ἀμερίστου τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, διότι μέση τῶν τε πάντη σωμάτων ἐξηρημένων ἐστὶν καὶ τῶν κεχυμένων εἰς τὰ σώματα, καὶ τῶν ἑαυτῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γεγονότων, αὐτὴν τε ἑαυτῆς καὶ ἄλλων οὖσαν. οὐκ ἄρα ἀνεξόμεθα λέγειν ἡμεῖς οὕτω μέσην αὐτὴν, ὡς ἔχουσάν τι καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ σωματικόν, ὡς Ἐρατοσθένης ὑπέλαβεν, ἢ διάστημα γεωμετρικόν ἐπὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς ἀναφέρειν, ὡς Σευῆρος· κράσις γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο ἀδιαστάτου καὶ διαστατοῦ καὶ ἀμερίστου καὶ σώματος· οὐδ' γὰρ σημείου καὶ γραμμῆς.

In any case, it is from this [sc. the visible sort of Being] and from the indivisible that the soul exists, because it is a mean between what is entirely transcendent of bodies and what is distributed in bodies, as well as between what is in and of itself and what has come to be in relation to something else – the soul being itself something that is both in and of itself, as well as in relation to another. We must not uphold that view that the soul is intermediate in the sense that it possesses something both corporeal and incorporeal, as Eratosthenes supposed. Nor should we compare its Being to 'geometrical extension' as Severus does, for there could never be a mixture of the extended and the unextended, nor a mixture of the indivisible and the corporeal, any more than there could be a mixture of a point and a line. (trans. Baltzly)

- T 8 Iambl. *DA ap. Stob.* 1.378.6-7 W.: Ἄλλη τοίνυν αἴρεσις τῶν Πλατωνικῶν οὐ κατὰ τοὺς δημιουργικοὺς κλήρους, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς διαιρέσεις τῶν κριττόνων γενῶν οἷον θεῶν, ἀγγέλων, δαιμόνων, ἡρώων, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς νομὰς τοῦ παντός διακρίνει τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν διαφερόντων τόπων καταβάσεις τῶν ψυχῶν· τιθεμένη δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν αἰεὶ εἶναι ἐν σώματι, ὥσπερ ἡ Ἐρατοσθένους καὶ Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Πλατωνικοῦ καὶ ἄλλων, ἀπὸ σωμάτων αὐτὴν λεπτοτέρων εἰς τὰ ὀστρεώδη πάλιν εἰσοικίζει σώματα· διατρίβειν μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴν εἰς μοῖραν τινα τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, καθήκειν γε μὴν εἰς τὸ στερεὸν σῶμα ἄλλοτε ἀπ' ἄλλων τοῦ παντός τόπων. Καὶ τούτους Ἡρακλείδην μὲν τὸν Ποντικὸν ἀφορίζει περὶ τὸν γαλαξίαν, ἄλλους δὲ καθ' ὅλας τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰς σφαίρας, ἀφ' ὧν δὴ δεῦρο κατιέναι τὰς ψυχὰς· τοὺς δὲ περὶ σελήνην ἢ ἐν τῷ ὑπὸ σελήνην ἀέρι λέγειν αὐτὰς κατοικεῖν καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν κάτω χωρεῖν εἰς τὴν περίγειον γένεσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἀπὸ σωμάτων αἰεὶ στερεῶν πίπτειν εἰς ἕτερα σώματα διισχυρίζεσθαι.

Another set of Platonists does not make this distinction that the descents of souls occur from different places according to the allotments of the Demiurge, according to the divisions of the superior classes (as for example, gods, angels, demons, and heroes), and according to the

- distributions in the universe. Rather they posit that the soul is always in a body (as Eratosthenes, Ptolemy the Platonist, and others do) and make it pass from subtler bodies into dense bodies. For, they assert, the soul spends time in some portion of the sensible world, and descends into solid body at different times from different places in the universe. These places from which the souls descend here Heraclides of Pontus locates around the Milky Way; others throughout all the heavenly spheres. Some say that souls dwell around the moon or in the air under the moon and that they descend from there into earthly creation, while others firmly maintain that they always fall from solid bodies into other [solid] bodies. The various descents into this realm take place from so many and such different places, and the manner [of these descents] also differs in many ways. (trans. Finamore/Dillon)
- T 9 Aet. IV.2.3 (Stobaeus, ps.-Plutarch) = DG386b8-10 (386a12-14): Πυθαγόρας ἀριθμὸν ἑαυτὸν κινούντα, τὸν δ' ἀριθμὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ νοῦ παραλαμβάνει.
Pythagoras [says the soul is] self-moving number, taking number to stand for intellect.
- T 10 *Quaest. Plat.* VIII, 1007c5-6: καὶ γὰρ ἡ ψυχῆς οὐσία κατὰ τοὺς παλαιοὺς 'ἀριθμὸς ἦν αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν κινῶν'
In fact, the ancients even held that the essence of soul is number moving itself.
- T 11 1022F7-1023A1: οἱ δὲ σωματικὴν ἀξιοῦντες ὕλην συμμίσγυσθαι τῇ ἀμερίστῳ διαμαρτάνουσι.
But those who maintain that corporeal matter is mixed with the indivisible being are utterly mistaken.
- T 12 1023B5-D2: (a) "Ὁμοία δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ἀντειπεῖν καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ποσειδώνιον· οὐ γὰρ μακρὰν τῆς ὕλης ἀπέστησαν· (b) ἀλλὰ δεξάμενοι τὴν τῶν περάτων οὐσίαν περὶ τὰ σώματα λέγεσθαι μεριστὴν καὶ ταῦτα τῷ νοητῷ μίξαντες (c) ἀπεφάναντο τὴν ψυχὴν ιδέαν εἶναι τοῦ πάντη διαστατοῦ κατ'ἀριθμὸν συνεστῶσαν ἀρμονίαν περιέχοντα· (d) τὰ τε γὰρ μαθηματικὰ τῶν πρώτων νοητῶν μεταξὺ καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τετάχθαι, τῆς τε ψυχῆς, τῶν νοητῶν τὸ αἰδίων καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὸ παθητικὸν ἐχούσης, προσήκον ἐν μέσῳ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπάρχειν. (e) ἔλαθε γὰρ καὶ τούτους ὁ θεὸς τοῖς τῶν σωμάτων πέρασιν ὕστερον, ἀπειργασμένης ἤδη τῆς ψυχῆς, χρώμενος ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς ὕλης διαμόρφωσιν, τὸ σκεδαστὸν αὐτῆς καὶ ἀσύνδετον ὀρίζων καὶ περιλαμβάνων ταῖς ἐκ τῶν τριγώνων συναρμοττομένων ἐπιφανείαις. (f) ἀτοπώτερον δὲ τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν ιδέαν ποιεῖν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀεικίνητος ἢ δ' ἀκίνητος, καὶ ἢ μὲν ἀμιγῆς πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἢ δὲ τῷ σώματι συνειργμένη. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁ θεὸς τῆς μὲν ιδέας ὡς παραδείγματος γέγονε μιμητής, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ὥσπερ ἀποτελέσματος δημιουργός. (g) ὅτι δ' οὐδ' ἀριθμὸν ὁ Πλάτων τὴν οὐσίαν τίθεται τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ ταττομένην ὑπ' ἀριθμοῦ, προεῖρηται.
(a) We can make similar objections to Posidonius cum suis. Indeed, they did not observe a great distance from matter, (b) but rather, having taken 'the divisible in the presence of bodies' to mean the being of the limits and having blended these limits with the intelligible, (c) they declared the soul to be *the form of what is everyway extended, constituted according to number that comprehends harmony*. (d) This is based on the idea that the mathematical are situated between the primary intelligibles and the sense-perceptibles and that it is appropriate that the soul, which possesses the everlastingness of intelligibles and the passivity of perceptibles, has its being in the middle. (e) For these people, too, failed to notice that god uses the limits of bodies only at a later stage, when he had already completed the production of the soul: by means of them he provides internal structure to matter, by demarcating and enclosing its dispersiveness and unboundedness with the surfaces made of the triangles fitted together. (f) What is more absurd, however, is to make the soul a Form: for whereas soul is always in motion, Form is immobile; whereas Form does not mix with the sense-perceptible, soul is conjoined with the body; in addition, god's relation to Form has become that of the imitator of a paradigm, whereas his relation to soul is like that of artisan to finished product. (g) And that Plato does not make number the being of soul, but rather presents the soul as being ordered by number: that we have explained earlier.
- T 13 DL 7.157 (Posidonius F 139 E/K): Ζήνων δ' ὁ Κιτιεὺς καὶ Ἀντίπατρος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ Ποσειδώνιος πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν· τούτῳ γὰρ ἡμᾶς εἶναι ἔμπνους καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου κινεῖσθαι.
Zeno of Citium [SVF, 1.135] and Antipater in his *On Soul* and Posidonius say that soul is warm breath, for it is by this that we have the breath of life in us, and by its agency we move. (trans. E. Kidd)
- T 14 Diogenes Laertius 3.67: Τὰ δὲ ἀρέσκοντα αὐτῷ ταῦτα ἦν. Ἀθάνατον ἔλεγε τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ πολλὰ μεταμφεινυμένην σώματα, ἀρχὴν τε ἔχειν ἀριθμητικὴν, τὸ δὲ σῶμα γεωμετρικὴν· ὠρίζετο δὲ αὐτὴν ιδέαν τοῦ πάντη διεστῶτος πνεύματος.

The doctrines he approved are these. He held that the soul is immortal, that by transmigration it puts on many bodies, and that it has a numerical first principle, whereas the first principle of the body is geometrical; and he defined soul as the idea of vital breath diffused in all directions. (trans. R.D. Hicks)

- T 15 Sext. Emp. *AM* 7.93-94: καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν φῶς, φησὶν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὸν Πλάτωνος Τίμαιον ἐξηγούμενος, ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὀψείως καταλαμβάνεται, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου. ἦν δὲ ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ὑποστάσεως ἀριθμός. διὸ καὶ ὁ κριτὴς τῶν πάντων λόγος οὐκ ἀμέτοχος ὢν τῆς τούτου δυνάμεως καλοῖτο ἂν ἀριθμός. καὶ τοῦτο ἐμφαίνοντες οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ ποτὲ μὲν εἰώθασιν λέγειν τὸ ἀριθμῶ δέ τε πάντ' ἐπέοικεν, ὅτε δὲ κτλ.

And, as Posidonius says in expounding Plato's *Timaeus*, "Just as light is apprehended by sight, which is luminous, and sound by hearing, which is airy, so too the nature of the whole ought to be apprehended by something akin to it, namely reason." But the starting-point in the constitution of the whole is number. And this means that reason, the judge of all things, could also be called number, since it is not without a share in its power. (94) And in pointing this out the Pythagoreans are sometimes in the habit of saying everything is like number. (trans. R. Bett)

- T 16 Sext. Emp. *AM* 7.119: Πλάτων δὲ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ πρὸς παράστασιν τοῦ ἀσώματον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει τῆς ἀποδείξεως κέχρηται. εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὄρασις, φησὶ, φωτὸς ἀντιλαμβανομένη εὐθύς ἐστὶ φωτοειδής, ἡ δὲ ἀκοὴ ἀέρα πεπληγμένον κρίνουσα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὴν φωνήν, εὐθύς ἀεροειδὴς θεωρεῖται, ἡ δὲ ὄσφρησις ἀτμοὺς γνωρίζουσα πάντως ἐστὶν ἀτμοειδὴς καὶ ἡ γεύσις χυλοὺς χυλοειδὴς, κατ' ἀνάγκην καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰς ἀσωμάτους ιδέας λαμβάνουσα, καθάπερ τὰς ἐν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς πέρασι τῶν σωμάτων, γίνεται τις ἀσώματος.

But Plato in the *Timaeus* uses the same type of demonstration for the purpose of demonstrating the fact that the soul is incorporeal. For, he says, if sight in apprehending light is right away luminous, and hearing, in discerning air being struck (which is sound), is right away observed to be airy, and smell in picking up vapors is definitely vaporous, and taste in picking up flavors is flavor-like, then necessarily the soul too, in grasping the incorporeal ideas, such as those in numbers and those in the limits of bodies, becomes an incorporeal sort of thing. (trans. R. Bett)

- T 17 Achilles, *Intr. in Ar.* 13 (= Posid. F149, partim): Ποσειδώνιος δὲ ἀγνοεῖν τοὺς Ἐπικουρείους ἔφη, ὡς οὐ τὰ σώματα τὰς ψυχὰς συνέχει, ἀλλ' αἱ ψυχαὶ τὰ σώματα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ κόλλα καὶ ἑαυτὴν καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς κρατεῖ. Posidonius said that the Epicureans do not know that it is not bodies which hold souls together, but souls bodies, just as glue controls both itself and what is outside it. (trans. Kidd)

- T 18 Iambl. *De an.* 4 (Finamore-Dillon) / 7 (Martone), ap. Stob. *Ecl.* I.49, p. 363.26-364.7 Wachsmuth: Μετὰ δὴ ταῦτα τοὺς εἰς μαθηματικὴν οὐσίαν ἐντιθέντας τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς καταλέγω διευκρινημένως. "Ἔστι δὴ γένος ἓν τι αὐτῆς τὸ σχῆμα, πέρας δὲ διαστάσεως, καὶ αὐτὴ <ἡ> διάστασις. Ἐν αὐτοῖς μὲν οὖν τούτοις Σεβήρος ὁ Πλατωνικὸς αὐτὴν ἀφώρῃσατο, ἐν ιδέᾳ δὲ τοῦ πάντη διαστατοῦ Σπεύσιππος· ἐν αἰτίᾳ δὲ ἦτοι ἐνώσει τούτων ἄλλος ἂν τις καθαρώτερον αὐτὴν προστήσαιο τελεώτατα.

Πάλιν τοίνυν ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἐν ἐτέρῳ γένει κεῖται. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτον ἀπλῶς μὲν οὕτως ἔνιοι τῶν Πυθαγορείων τῇ ψυχῇ συναρμολογοῦσιν· ὡς δ' αὐτοκίνητον Ξενοκράτης, ὡς δὲ λόγους περιεχούση Μοδέρατος ὁ Πυθαγόρειος, ὡς δὲ κριτικὸν κοσμοῦργοῦ θεοῦ ὄργανον Ἰππασος, ὁ ἀκουσματικὸς τῶν Πυθαγορείων· ὡς δ' Ἀριστοτέλης ἱστορεῖ, Πλάτων ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἐνὸς ιδέας καὶ τοῦ πρώτου μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους αὐτὸ τὸ ζῶον προϋποτιθέμενος καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν νοῦν, τὴν δὲ δυάδα ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν δὲ τὸν τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθμόν, τὸν δὲ τοῦ στερεοῦ [τὴν] αἴσθησιν διορίζόμενος.

Next, I propose to list carefully those who relate the essence of the soul with mathematical essence. Of this the first kind is figure, which is the limit of extension, and extension itself. In these very terms it was defined by Severus the Platonist, while Speusippus defined it as "the form of the omnidimensionally extended." One might, however, employing a purer definition, define it most perfectly as the cause, or rather the unity, prior to these two. Number, again, constitutes a second kind [of mathematical essence], and indeed some of the Pythagoreans apply it to the soul simply as such; Xenocrates [applies it] as self-moved; Moderatus the Pythagorean, as comprising ratios; Hippasus the Pythagorean auditor, as being the instrument by which the god who creates the world measures. As Aristotle relates, Plato [constructs the soul] by premising that the Essential Living Being is made up of the idea of the one and of the primary length <and breadth> and depth, and defining the one

- as intellect, the dyad as scientific knowledge, the number of the plane, opinion, and sense-perception the number of the solid. (trans. J. Finamore - J. Dillon)
- T 19 Timaeus Locrus 208.13-209.1: Τὰν δὲ τῷ κόσμῳ ψυχὰν μεσόθεν ἐξάψας ἐπάγαγεν, ἔξω περικαλύψας αὐτὸν ὅλον αὐτῷ, κράμα αὐτὰν κερασάμενος ἔκ τε τὰς ἀμερίστῳ μορφᾷς καὶ τὰς μεριστᾷς οὐσίας, ὡς ἐν κράμα ἐκ δύο τουτέων εἶμεν. ᾧ ποτέμιξε δύο δυνάμεις ἀρχὰς κινασίων, τὰς τε ταύτῳ καὶ τὰς τῷ ἐτέρῳ· ἃ δὴ καὶ δύσμικτος ἔασσα οὐκ ἐκ τῷ ῥάστῳ συνεκίρνατο. λόγοι δ' οἶδε πάντες ἐντὶ κατ' ἀριθμῶς ἀρμονικῶς συγκεκραμένοι. ὡς λόγως κατὰ μοῖραν διαιρῆται ποτ' ἐπιστάμαν, ὡς μὴ ἀγνοῇν ἐξ ὧν ἃ ψυχὰ καὶ δι' ὧν συνέστακεν.
- T 20 Timaeus Locrus 206.3-4: τὰν δὲ περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστὰν εἶμεν καὶ τὰς θατέρῳ φύσιος
Plut. De an. procr. 1025B3-6: συνήγαγεν οὐ δι' αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' οὐσίας ἐτέρας μεταξὺ, τὴν μὲν ἀμέριστον πρὸ τοῦ ταύτου πρὸ δὲ τοῦ θατέρου τὴν μεριστήν, ἔστιν ἢ προσήκουσαν ἐκατέραν ἐκατέρᾳ τάξας. He united <sameness and difference>, not just by themselves; but by first interposing other beings, the indivisible in front of sameness and in front of difference the divisible, as each of the one pair is in a way akin to one of the other.
1024D9-11: ἐκάτερον γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐτέρας ἀρχῆς κάτεισι, τὸ μὲν ταῦτόν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς τὸ δὲ θάτερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυάδος. In fact, each of the two derives from another of two principles, sameness from the one and difference from the dyad.
- T 21 Timaeus Locrus 216.20-21: τὸ δὲ δωδεκάεδρον εἰκόνα τῷ παντὸς ἐστάσατο, ἔγγιστα σφαῖρα ἐόν.
Plut., Quaest. Plat. V, 1003C8-9: Πότερον, ὡς ὑπονοοῦσιν ἔνιοι, τὸ δωδεκάεδρον τῷ σφαιροειδεῖ προσένειμεν;
- T 22 Plat. Tim. 67B2-4: ὅλως μὲν οὖν φωνὴν θῶμεν τὴν δι' ὧτων ὑπ' ἀέρος ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἵματος μέχρι ψυχῆς πληγὴν διαδιδομένην
- T 23 Timaeus Locrus 220.4-5: Φωνὰ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν πλάξις ἐν ἀέρι διικνουμένα ποτὶ τὰν ψυχὰν δι' ὧτων
- T 24 Plut. Quaest. Plat. VII, 1005B4-5: ἔστι γὰρ ἡ φωνὴ πληγὴ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου δι' ὧτων ὑπ' ἀέρος.
Sound, in fact, is the impact made by air through the ears upon the percipient.
- T 25 Plat. Tim. 79E10-80A4: Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἰατρικὰς σικύας παθημάτων αἰτία καὶ τὰ τῆς καταπόσεως τὰ τε τῶν ῥιπτουμένων, ὅσα ἀφεθέντα μετέωρα καὶ ὅσα ἐπὶ γῆς φέρεται, ταύτῃ διωκτέον, καὶ ὅσοι φθογγοὶ ταχεῖς τε καὶ βραδεῖς ὁξεῖς τε καὶ βαρεῖς φαίνονται
80B8-C3: καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ τῶν ὑδάτων πάντα ρεύματα, ἔτι δὲ τὰ τῶν κεραυνῶν πτώματα καὶ τὰ θαυμαζόμενα ἡλέκτρων περὶ τῆς ἑλξεως καὶ τῶν Ἡρακλείων λίθων, πάντων τούτων ὅλη μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδενὶ ποτε κτλ.
- T 26 Timaeus Locrus 221.1-7: ἃ γὰρ σικύα καὶ τὸ ἡλεκτρον εἰκόνες ἀναπνοᾶς ἐντι. [...] ἃ δὲ σικύα ἀπαναλωθέντος ὑπὸ τῷ πυρὸς τῷ ἀέρος ἐφέλκεται τὸ ὑγρόν, τὸ δ' ἡλεκτρον ἐκκριθέντος τῷ πνεύματι ἀναλαμβάνει † τὸ ὅμοιον σῶμα
- T 27 Plut. Quaest. Plat. VII, 1004E11-1005A3: Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὸ περὶ τὴν σικύαν τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· ὁ περιληφθεὶς ὑπ' αὐτῆς πρὸς τῇ σαρκὶ μετὰ θερμότητος ἄῃρ ἐκπυρῶθεις καὶ γενόμενος τῶν τοῦ χαλκοῦ πόρων ἀραιότερος ἐξέπεσεν οὐκ εἰς κενὴν χώραν, οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰς δὲ τὸν περιεστώτα τὴν σικύαν ἔξωθεν ἀέρα, κάκεινον ἀπέωσεν· ὁ δὲ τὸν πρὸ αὐτοῦ· καὶ τοῦτο πάσχων αἰεὶ καὶ δρῶν ὁ ἔμπροσθεν ὑποχωρεῖ, τῆς κενουμένης γλιχόμενος χώρας, ἣν ὁ πρῶτος ἐξέλιπεν· | οὕτω δὲ τῇ σαρκὶ περιπίπτων, ἥς ἡ σικύα δέδρακται, καὶ ἀναζέων ἅμα συνεκθλίβει τὸ ὑγρὸν εἰς τὴν σικύαν.
1005B6-C2: Τὸ δ' ἡλεκτρον οὐδὲν ἔλκει τῶν παρακειμένων [...] ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν λίθος τινὰς ἀπορροίας ἐξίησιν ἐμβριθεῖς καὶ πνευματώδεις [...] τὸ δ' ἡλεκτρον ἔχει μὲν τι φλογοειδὲς ἢ πνευματικόν.

Tim. 35A, 36D8-C ₅	Definition/account	1. Indivisible	2. Divisible	3. Same	4. Other	evidence for two-step mixture	a. cognition (36D8-C ₅)	b. kinetic (36D8-C ₅)	c.dimen-sion/form of body (36D8-C ₅)
<i>Plato ap. Ar. DA I.2, a</i>		y	y	y	y		x		
<i>Plato ap. Ar. DA I.3</i>		y	y	y	y			x	x
<i>[Plato] ap. Ar. DA I.2, b</i>		One	first line, breadth, depth						x
<i>[Plato] ap. Ar. DA I.2, c</i>		One-nous	2. episteme, 3. doxa, 4. aisthesis			x	x		
<i>Anon., Ar. DA T2.d</i>	self-moving number						x	x	
<i>Xenocr. T5</i>	self-moving number	One	Multiplicity	Rest	Motion			x	
<i>Xenocr. T12, g</i>	(self-moving number)						x	x [cf. T2.c]	
<i>Pythag. T20</i>	self-moving number						(x)	x	
<i>Xenocr. ap. Iambl. T17</i>	self-moving number								
<i>Pythag./Xenocr. ap. Aët., T20</i>	self-moving number								
<i>'Ancients' ap. Plut., T21</i>	self-moving number								
<i>Crantor T5, T7</i>	mixture of intelligible and doxastic nature	Intell. nature	Doxastic nature	Same	Other		?	x	
<i>"some", T10 (Crantor?)</i>	mixture of corporeal matter with the intelligible								
<i>Eratosthenes, T22</i>	mixture of the incorporeal and the bodily	The incorporeal	Body						(x?)
<i>Eudorus, T9</i>	?								
<i>Posidonius c.s., T12</i>	"the idea of what is everyway extended, itself constituted according to number that embraces concord"	The intelligible	The being of limits			?	x	x	x
<i>Speusippus (? acc. to Iambl.)</i>	"the idea of what is everyway extended"	cf. [Plato] ap. Ar. DA I.2, b					(x)		x
<i>Plato ap. DL (Pos.), T25</i>	"the idea of pneuma everyway extended"	cf. [Plato] ap. Ar. DA I.2, b							
<i>Severus T17, T22</i>	geometrical interval (number as measuring instrument used for creation)	Point	Line						x
<i>Hippasus T17</i>									x?
<i>Tim. Locr., T29</i>		1. Indivisible	2. Divisible	3. Same	4. Other	x	x	x	x
<i>Ps.-Arch. T41</i>		cf. [Plato] ap. Ar. DA I.2, a					x		